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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001538

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [SU](#) [UNSC](#) [KPKO](#)

SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: SO CLOSE YET STILL SO FAR AWAY FROM
DARFUR RESOLUTION

REF: USUN NEW YORK 001349

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Classified By: POL MINS-COUNS WILLIAM BRENCICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

SUMMARY

11. (C) Expectations are mounting ahead of August 17 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) consultations on Darfur, and the question remains of how to proceed on the draft resolution authorizing transition of the African Union (AU) Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a UN operation. The draft is stuck in the P5, and we must proceed on the basis of an emerging agreement in the P3, bolstered with African support in the Council. China and Russia flatly refuse to go any further without Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU) consent. Clearly some sort of engagement is needed to progress on adoption and implementation of the draft text, and this cable outlines some ideas and proposals to achieving this end. END SUMMARY.

NO CONSENT, NO RESOLUTION

12. (C) In an August 11 Experts Meeting both Chinese and Russian representatives stated unequivocally that neither Beijing nor Moscow would support adoption of the draft text without Khartoum's consent, even though both delegates admitted that such consent at this stage was not technically necessary for passage of the resolution. In P5 meetings, the Chinese delegate acknowledged that Khartoum had responded to pressure from the international community in the past, but warned that to do so with the draft resolution currently under consideration could undermine the resolution's eventual implementation, which will necessitate GNU consent as a prerequisite. The Russian delegate shared this assessment.

13. (C) No doubt that when the draft resolution is circulated to the wider Council, possibly by August 20, Qatar will echo

these sentiments and insist on GNU consent for adoption. The African UNSC Members told USUN informally they would support pushing ahead with adoption without Khartoum's consent, but they have not responded with comments on the draft resolution text we passed to them. It remains to be seen if in August 17 Darfur consultations they will put their money where their mouth is in the face of strenuous Chinese, Russian and Qatari opposition.

TURNING SYG RECOMMENDATION ON ITS HEAD

¶4. (C) The UN seems to be exhausting its diplomatic possibilities with regard to Khartoum. At his monthly luncheon with the UNSC on August 11, SYG Annan outlined a plan to invite GNU officials (possibly FM Lam Akol or even President Bashir) to New York to answer to their continued opposition to a UN Darfur force to the Security Council. Also discussed was the possibility of including AU Commission Chairperson Konare and Arab League Secretary-General Amre Moussa in such a session to account for the current stalled situation in AMIS transition.

¶5. (C) USUN believes such an approach would be counterproductive. While a personal audience with the Security Council could give the Sudanese government the 'face' it seeks in the eyes of the international community, taking Sudan to task in such a setting could have the unintended effect of further strengthening GNU resolve against granting its consent for deployment of UN forces in Darfur, especially if a resolution were adopted 'against its will' prior to this meeting. Conversely, such a meeting could stall the timetable for consideration of the draft resolution if convened before the resolution's adoption, giving the GNU a chance to exercise its unofficial veto over Council action by delaying its RSVP or otherwise prolonging

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its consideration of the invitation. Further, inviting FM Lam would have no effect on GNU decisions, and President Bashir would likely either refuse to come or use the meeting as a soapbox for his refusal of AMIS transition. Conversations with UKUN indicated an assessment similar to ours on prospects for success of such a meeting. We would be interested in Embassy Khartoum's views on the SYG's proposal.

HELP US HELP YOU

¶6. (C) Rather than bringing Sudan before its Council critics, USUN recommends taking our show on the road to Khartoum to 'court' President Bashir, following on reftel recommendations. Just as former Deputy Secretary Zoellick's personal engagement in Abuja helped to turn the tide for the Darfur Peace Agreement, so too could a visit by a high-level U.S. diplomat to Sudan for the re-hatting resolution.

¶7. (C) The message could be concise and clear and couched in terms of mutual benefit: help us help you to safeguard Darfur. The envoy could clarify any GNU concerns about the draft resolution while remaining honest about the Council's intentions to adopt it expeditiously. Any incentives package could best be delivered in such a setting. In this way, we could determine the timetable and not be held hostage to Khartoum's stall tactics, and President Bashir would get the visible 'supplication' he considers so integral to his granting of consent without being conspicuously subjected to the scrutiny of the Council in New York, a face-saving mechanism in itself.

AGREE OCTOBER 1 AND EXPEDITE ADOPTION

¶8. (C) Pushing through a fully realized October 1 transition date becomes more difficult with each passing day as the practical realities of what is feasible by then continue to shrink. However, we have worked out OP4 language with the UK that addresses a transition process that would, all things

being equal, take effect on October 1. Department guidance on this language is appreciated. While France originally objected to our insistence on October 1, UKUN seems convinced France will accept our compromise language, which, bracketed troops numbers in OP3 aside, would allow us to move a P3 text forward formally to the African UNSC Members as soon as possible.

19. (C) It is not expected, based on preliminary consultations with the African Members, that they will object to the draft resolution. Once their agreement is secured, we can circulate the draft text to the whole Council for consideration, hopefully as early as August 17 consultations.

Japan will likely voice the same concerns as did France over the October 1 date (for budgetary reasons) but would be more likely to come on board if the French had done the same. No real opposition is expected from the other European and Latin American UNSC Members. If the issue of GNU consent is unexpectedly addressed by this point, no real opposition should be expected either from China or Russia or, by extension, from Qatar.

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